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THE FOURTH “r”: SUSTAINING THE ADA’S 
PRIVATE “RIGHT” OF ACTION AGAINST 
STATES FOR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: Jane Doe,1 a student with cerebral 
palsy who is wheelchair bound, is unable to navigate the building where 
she attends school because of various architectural barriers. Moreover, 
while her disability imposes significant physical limitations, she carries 
herself with personality and intelligence. While mentally, she is more than 
capable of learning and contributing to the world around her, she faces 
educators who assume that her physical challenges translate to an inability 
to learn like other children.  
Over the course of her career as a student, Jane’s parents have spent 
countless hours meeting with teachers and administrators in order to 
ensure that Jane’s educational needs are met. These perceived limitations 
serve to hinder not only her progress but also her access to various 
educational resources. After all, from an administrative point of view, 
apathy with respect to various physical and institutional barriers to Jane’s 
education seems much more justified if it is assumed that any benefit she 
might derive from the educational system is at best limited.2 Jane’s 
parents, aware that her teachers assume that her physical limitations render 
any attempts to teach her to read futile, hire a private tutor who is willing 
to use a teaching method that takes into account Jane’s special needs.3 
 1. I would like to extend a special thanks to a colleague, Alene Haskell, who shared some of the 
experiences she has had in dealing with her child’s education, which served as a basis for formulating 
Jane Doe.  
 2. My own experience as a student with a visual disability in the public schools was 
extraordinarily positive. However, early on, there were those individuals in my school district who 
imputed from my visual limitations a diminished mental capacity. It was only at the insistence of an 
elementary school teacher that my standardized test scores were included with the rest of my 
classmates. While the inclusion of test scores is relatively minor, such reluctance is indicative of the 
problematic nature of general societal attitudes that bear no relation to one’s actual disability, yet serve 
to impose limitations on the potential of the disabled.  
 3. It is this attitude, known as the “spread effect,” that Professor Bagenstos argues is 
problematic. Samuel Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 
Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 926 (2004) (“[S]ociety frequently views a disability as 
imposing limitations that are more severe or more extensive than they actually are. This ‘spread 
effect’—in which a limitation in one functional area is erroneously viewed as indicating the existence 
of limitations in other functional areas”—often justifies various forms of discrimination against the 
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Her experiences are representative of the problems typically faced by 
disabled students and their parents. In 1990, Congress enacted the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a sweeping piece of legislation 
that sought fundamental change in the treatment of the disabled.4 Title II 
of the ADA imposes on public entities, including state and local 
governments, an obligation to avoid discrimination against the disabled in 
the provision of public services.5 Title II provides for enforcement of its 
nondiscrimination provisions through actions filed in federal courts by 
private citizens.6  
Under Title II’s enforcement provision, Congress also authorized suits 
by private citizens in federal court against state entities, thus expressing its 
clear intent to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity.7 The Supreme 
Court has held that Congress may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to its enforcement powers under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.8  
disabled as rational.).  
 4. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). The ADA was a 
sweeping mandate for antidiscrimination in both the public and private sectors. See id.  
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2000). Section 12132 provides “no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits 
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity.” Id. § 12132. 
 6. Id. § 12133. Under the statutory scheme, § 12133 incorporates by reference the enforcement 
provisions under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2000)). This 
act, in turn, incorporates the rights and remedies provided in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
29 U.S.C. § 794a (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d(6), 2000e-16, 2000e-5(f)-(k)). The Supreme 
Court has recognized an implied right to a private action to enforce these provisions. See Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001).  
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000). 
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this 
chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, 
remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to 
the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any 
public or private entity other than a State.  
Id. Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
While a strict reading of this language suggests that state sovereign immunity precludes only those 
suits brought against a state by non-residents, the Supreme Court has long recognized immunity from 
suit in federal court by a state’s own citizens. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).  
 8. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“Congress may, in determining 
what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally 
impermissible in other contexts.”). The Fourteenth Amendment, in pertinent part, reads as follows:  
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/6
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Recently, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Title 
II’s abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity in its decision in 
Tennessee v. Lane.9 The Lane Court held that the appropriateness of Title 
II should be determined on an as-applied basis.10 Consequently, the Court 
limited its inquiry to whether Title II of the ADA as applied to court 
access (at issue in Lane) was a valid exercise of congressional power 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (“section 5”).11 The Court’s 
opinion left open the question of whether a student such as Jane has the 
right to sue a state or one of its agencies for perceived violations of Title II 
in the education context.12 The Court expressly avoided the question of the 
constitutionality of Title II as applied to access for the disabled to public 
services beyond those provided by the judiciary.13 
The Note that follows analyzes the constitutionality of Title II as a 
valid exercise of Congress’s section 5 authority in the context of 
education.14 The Note is organized as follows. Part II presents a discussion 
of the background surrounding the enactment of the ADA and the 
Supreme Court’s section 5 jurisprudence.15 Part III argues that Title II’s 
abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity would likely be deemed 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
. . .  
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.  
 9. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).  
 10. Id. at 1992–94.  
 11. Id. at 1993. The Lane decision was the second case analyzing the ADA’s abrogation of the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. In 2001, the Court held invalid the ADA’s Title I abrogation 
of state sovereign immunity as it applied to nondiscrimination in state employment practices. Bd. of 
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). Some commentators argued that the 
Garrett decision was a death knell for Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., 
Alison Tanchyk, An Eleventh Amendment Victory: The Eleventh Amendment vs. Title II of the ADA, 75 
TEMP. L. REV. 675, 675 (2002) (“The days when a disabled individual could sue a state for monetary 
damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . are numbered.”). But see 
Timothy J. Cahill & Betsy Malloy, Overcoming the Obstacles of Garrett: An “As Applied” Saving 
Construction for the ADA’s Title II, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133 (2004) (advocating an “as applied” 
approach to the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity 
nearly identical to that adopted by the Supreme Court in Lane).  
 12. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (“Because we find that Title II unquestionably is valid § 5 legislation 
as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services, we need go no 
further.”).  
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra notes 18–32 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 18–99 and accompanying text.  
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invalid under the Supreme Court’s current analytical model.16 Part IV 
proposes a modification to the Court’s current approach to equal 
protection cases that would likely save Congress’s enactment of the ADA 
from an Eleventh Amendment challenge.17 Part V concludes the 
discussion.  
II. BACKGROUND 
In July of 1990, the ADA passed both houses of Congress with wide 
bipartisan support.18 This legislation was hailed as the dawn of a new era 
in civil rights law.19 In its official findings, Congress noted that the 
disabled population in America faced significant societal barriers in access 
to such basics as education, transportation, public buildings, and 
employment.20  
 16. See infra notes 100–25 and accompanying text 
 17. See infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text. 
 18. The ADA passed the House by a vote of 377–28. 136 CONG. REC. H4629 (daily ed. July 12, 
1990). The ADA passed the Senate with ninety-one votes for and six against. 136 CONG. REC. S9695 
(daily ed. July 13, 1990).  
 19. Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 933 (reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
601, 601 (1990)). Upon signing the ADA into law, the President stated, “[i]t is altogether fitting that 
the American people have once again given clear expression to our most basic ideals of freedom and 
equality. The Americans with Disabilities Act represents the full flowering of our democratic 
principles, and it gives me great pleasure to sign it into law today.” Id. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2000). Congress also found that the disabled are effectively 
relegated to second-class status because of stereotypes and unfair prejudices that unfairly limit their 
potential. See id. § 12101(a). Congress specifically found:  
 (1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and 
this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older; 
 (2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, 
and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem; 
 (3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as 
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, 
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services; 
 (4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the 
basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination; 
 (5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, 
including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, 
transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make 
modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and 
criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or 
other opportunities; 
 (6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with 
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely 
disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally; 
 (7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/6
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The ADA represented a significant expansion of federal involvement in 
disability antidiscrimination law.21 After all, previous antidiscrimination 
laws focused on preventing discrimination by those entities receiving 
federal funding.22 Moreover, the ADA expanded the antidiscrimination 
provisions of previous federal laws, namely the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, to prohibit discriminatory behavior on a broader scale.23  
The ADA is divided into several titles.24 Title II, which applies to 
public services provided by public entities, is the focus of the current 
inquiry.25 Under Title II’s scheme, public entities, including state and local 
governments, must provide public services to any qualified individual with 
with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and 
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that 
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not 
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, 
society; 
 (8) the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality 
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such 
individuals; and 
 (9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice 
denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue 
those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United 
States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and 
nonproductivity. 
Id.  
 21. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications 
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 428–29 (1991) (noting 
that the majority of the federal statutes prohibiting discrimination against the disabled did not cover 
those activities that did not involve the federal government directly or indirectly through federal grants 
or contracts).  
 22. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). In addition to the Rehabilitation Act cited previously, the 
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) specifically addresses the educational needs of 
children with disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400–1487 et seq. (2000). The IDEA authorizes 
administrative hearings when disputes over the appropriate level of services arise between parents and 
educators. Id. § 1415(f). The IDEA guarantees to students with disabilities a free, appropriate special 
education from public schools. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). The ADA goes beyond either of these two 
statutes in broadly prohibiting discrimination against the disabled on the part of state actors in the 
provision of public services. 42 U.S.C § 12132.  
 23. See Burgdorf, supra note 21, at 430 n.93. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, prohibits 
discrimination based solely upon one’s disabled status. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). The ADA avoids the 
problem of determining the sole motivation for adverse actions taken against a disabled individual by 
eliminating this language. Burgdorf, supra note 21, at 430 n.93. By applying its antidiscrimination 
provisions to all sectors of society, Congress sought to “guarantee[] a baseline of equal citizenship by 
protecting against stigma and systematic exclusion from public and private opportunities, and protect[] 
society against the loss of valuable talents.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and 
“Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 471 (2000).  
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101–12213 (2000) (Title I focuses on the provision of public services by 
state agencies; Title II focuses on the provision of public services by private entities; Title IV contains 
miscellaneous provisions). 
 25. See id. §§ 12131–12134.  
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a disability.26 Furthermore, in order to ensure that disabled individuals are 
able to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions of Title II, the ADA 
authorizes private citizens to bring suit in federal courts (including actions 
against states and state agencies).27 Because Title II provides for private 
enforcement notwithstanding the sovereign immunity granted states by the 
Eleventh Amendment, an analysis of Title II as applied to education 
necessarily requires an understanding of both the Supreme Court’s section 
5 jurisprudence and its approach to congressional abrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity generally.  
The current Court’s sovereign immunity analysis began with Seminole 
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in which the Court held that Congress’s power 
to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity does not derive 
from its Article I commerce powers.28 In Seminole Tribe, a Native 
American tribe sought to enforce the provisions of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA).29 The Court established a two-part test for 
determining whether Congress has validly abrogated the states’ sovereign 
immunity: (1) Congress must express an unequivocal intent to abrogate 
that immunity; and, (2) the abrogation of that immunity must be a valid 
exercise of its constitutional authority.30 
Following Seminole Tribe, the Court issued its decision in City of 
Boerne v. Flores. City of Boerne is the first in a recent series of Supreme 
Court decisions addressing the appropriateness of section 5 legislation 
enacted by Congress.31 In City of Boerne, the Court addressed Congress’s 
enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).32 
The RFRA prohibited government entities (including state and local 
 26. Id. § 12132. Under Title II, a qualified individual with a disability is any person with a 
disability “who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal 
of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and 
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2). 
 27. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.  
 28. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64-5 (1996) (overruling the plurality decision 
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). In fact, the Court was clear that Congress’s 
Article I powers could not be used to extend the judicial power of the courts of the United States as 
enumerated in Article III. Id. at 65. The Court also reaffirmed Congress’s power to abrogate the states’ 
sovereign immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 72–73.  
 29. Id. at 47 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710). Under the IGRA, an Indian tribe could only engage in 
certain gaming activities if it reached a compact with the state in which such activities would take 
place. Id. Furthermore, the Act imposed a duty on the states to negotiate in “good faith” with a tribe 
interested in engaging in such activities. Id. Failure on the part of the state to negotiate in good faith 
authorized a tribe to seek redress in federal court. Id.  
 30. Id. at 55.  
 31. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 32. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/6
p631 Hampton book pages.doc11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] THE FOURTH “r” 637 
 
 
 
 
 
 
governments) from taking actions that “substantially burden” an 
individual’s exercise of his or her religious beliefs unless the government 
could demonstrate that such action was (1) meant to further a compelling 
government interest; and (2) representative of the least restrictive means 
for furthering that compelling interest.33  
According to the City of Boerne Court, Congress’s section 5 power 
extends to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions on 
constitutional violations, but does not work a substantive change in what 
constitutes such violations.34 Furthermore, congressional efforts to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment must bear some “congruence and 
proportionality” to the wrongs Congress seeks to prevent.35 In examining 
the RFRA, the Court held that the Act was wholly out of congruence and 
proportionality with the harms Congress sought to prevent.36 According to 
the Court, the RFRA was not a tailored response to constitutional 
violations; rather, it intruded into every level and sphere of government 
activity.37 City of Boerne began the congruence and proportionality 
analysis that has become an essential step in determining the 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). The RFRA was enacted as a response to the decision of the 
Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990), in which the Court declined to apply a balancing test in free-exercise cases involving generally 
applicable laws that burden religious practice. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512–13. Congress sought to 
overturn the Court’s decision in Smith and require federal courts to apply such a specific balancing test 
in analyzing free-exercise challenges to laws generally applicable to the public. Id. P.F. Flores, the 
Archbishop of San Antonio, sought from the City of Boerne a building permit to enlarge a parish 
located in an historic part of that city. Id. at 511–12. The city denied the building permit, and the 
Archbishop filed suit against the City of Boerne under the RFRA. Id. at 512. The district court 
concluded that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifth 
Circuit reversed. Id.  
 34. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20. The nature of section 5 is remedial rather than 
substantive. Id. Congress has the power to remedy and prevent constitutional violations of the states, 
but section 5 does not confer upon Congress the power to work a substantive change in the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself. Id.  
 35. Id. at 520 (“Congress must have wide latitude. . .” in creating enforcement measures under 
section 5, but “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted. . . . Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive 
in operation and effect.” Id.  
 36. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–36. The Court analyzed the record before Congress in 
enacting the RFRA and determined that it was distinctly lacking in “examples of modern instances of 
generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.” Id. at 530. Notwithstanding the 
legislative record, the “RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are 
to have any meaning. [The] RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object 
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Id. at 
532. 
 37. Id. at 532. Fundamentally, the Court objected to what it saw as Congress’s attempt to rewrite 
the substantive constitutional guarantees as it defined them. Id. at 519 (holding that Congress lacks the 
“power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States”).  
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constitutionality of congressional attempts at enforcement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
In 1999, the Supreme Court once again faced the issue of congressional 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in its decision in Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank.38 The Florida Prepaid Court addressed the validity of congressional 
amendments to U.S. patent laws that provided for explicit abrogation of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.39 Emphasizing the lack of an identified 
pattern of wrongful state conduct and what it viewed as the statute’s 
excessive breadth, the Florida Prepaid Court ultimately held that the 
Patent Remedy Act (PRA) failed the City of Boerne test, and therefore, its 
abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity was an invalid exercise of 
Congress’s section 5 power.40 
In Florida Prepaid, College Savings Bank, a New Jersey financial 
institution, sued Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board 
for patent infringement.41 In addressing the propriety of the infringement 
suit given congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the Court offered further refinement of the approach established by 
Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne.42 The Court held that the first prong of 
the test elaborated in Seminole Tribe was clearly met. That is, Congress 
was unequivocal in its intent to abrogate the immunity granted the states 
by the Eleventh Amendment.43  
In determining whether the PRA’s sovereign immunity provisions 
represented a valid exercise of power (i.e., the second prong of the 
Seminole Tribe analysis),44 the Court held that the PRA, like the RFRA in 
 38. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).  
 39. Id. at 630–31 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000)). Prior to these amendments, the 
patent laws did not explicitly include state entities among those against whom patent infringement 
actions could be pursued. Id. at 631 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988)). These amendments were a 
reaction to decisions of both the Supreme Court and courts of appeals that required Congress to 
explicitly state its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 631–32 (citations omitted).  
 40. Id. at 647 (“The historical record and the scope of coverage therefore make it clear that the 
Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 41. Id. at 630–31. College Savings Bank held a patent for its savings methodology that ensured 
that investors would accumulate sufficient funds to cover their children’s college education. Id. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board was an entity created by the state of Florida that 
provided similar college financial planning services for Florida residents. Id. at 631. In its complaint, 
College Savings alleged both direct and indirect infringement of its patent. Id.  
 42. Id. at 635–39 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), City of Boerne, 
527 U.S. at 530–31).  
 43. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635.  
 44. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55.  
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City of Boerne, was out of congruence and proportionality with the wrong 
Congress sought to prevent.45  
In its City of Boerne analysis, the Court emphasized the importance of 
identifying the constitutional violation that Congress seeks to prevent.46 
According to the Court, the remedy Congress created vastly outstripped 
the rather limited scope of state conduct with respect to patent 
infringement that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits.47 Florida Prepaid 
highlights the premium that the City of Boerne test places on identifying 
the specific constitutional right at issue in a given section 5 case and how 
Congress has sought to remedy previous assaults on, or perceived threats 
to, that constitutional right.48  
The year after the Court handed down Florida Prepaid, it once again 
had occasion to address section 5 legislation enacted by Congress in Kimel 
v. Florida Board of Regents.49 The Court addressed the constitutionality of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) as it applied to 
states, subjecting them to suit for age discrimination in employment 
practices.50 Once again, the Court analyzed whether Congress acted within 
 45. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638–47. The Court began its inquiry by analyzing the rights that the 
PRA sought to protect. Id. at 640. The Court determined that Congress failed to demonstrate a 
historical record of constitutional violations to justify prophylactic legislation in the form of the Patent 
Remedy Act. Id. at 645–46:  
The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not respond to a history 
of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the sort Congress has 
faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation. . . . Instead, Congress appears to have 
enacted this legislation in response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that 
do not necessarily violate the Constitution. (citations omitted). 
 46. Id. at 646. While the Court stated that the lack of a legislative record identifying the 
constitutional rights Congress was attempting to protect was not “determinative,” the Court, following 
City of Boerne, noted, “identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still a critical part of our 
§ 5 calculus because ‘[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted 
response to another, lesser one’.” Id. (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530).  
 47. Id. at 646. The Court criticized Congress for subjecting states to suit in federal court for 
myriad forms of patent infringement (many of which appear to fall outside of the realm of Fourteenth 
Amendment violations). In addition, Congress imposed no limitations on the duration of the states’ 
amenability to suit. Id. When section 5 legislation interferes with a range of constitutionally acceptable 
conduct, restricting the duration of such interference and limiting the application of such statutes to 
those states actually in violation of the constitutional provisions are indicative of the congruence and 
proportionality of Congress’s section 5 remedy. Id. at 647 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533). 
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined. Id. at 
648–65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters objected to the majority’s approach in Florida 
Prepaid, arguing that their approach tended not to give Congress its due deference. See id. at 654–65. 
 48. Id. at 646.  
 49. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  
 50. Id. at 66 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (2000)). The ADEA makes it unlawful for employers 
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). While the ADEA did not initially apply to employment 
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its section 5 powers via the two-step Seminole Tribe/City of Boerne 
inquiry.51  
After determining that Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate the protections of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court 
commenced its analysis of whether Congress acted appropriately under its 
section 5 authority.52 As in City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid, the Court 
once again determined that Congress had exceeded its section 5 
authority.53 Just as in Florida Prepaid, the Court focused on the lack of a 
legislative record that demonstrated congressional notice of widespread 
constitutional violations visited upon the aged by state employers.54 The 
lack of a record, coupled with the fact that the ADEA prohibited state 
actors from engaging in a much wider range of conduct than that which 
would actually constitute a constitutional violation, suggested that the 
ADEA was wholly out of congruence and proportionality with the wrongs 
Congress sought to prevent.55  
decisions made by states, Congress extended the definition of employers covered by the statute to 
include states in 1974. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 68. The ADEA authorized those aggrieved by age 
discrimination to enforce its provisions through private actions filed in either federal or state court. Id. 
These actions could be filed against any employer, including state and local governments or agencies. 
Id.  
 51. Id. at 73. In determining whether Congress had explicitly stated its intent to abrogate the 
states’ sovereign immunity, the Court ultimately determined that Congress’s amendment of the ADEA 
in 1974 to include state governments and agencies was sufficiently unequivocal about its intent to do 
so. Id. at 75–76.  
 52. Id. at 78–92 (applying the “congruence and proportionality” analysis as established in City of 
Boerne).  
 53. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.  
Congress’ failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here 
confirms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was 
necessary in this field. In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act’s substantive 
requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination 
by the States, we hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress’ power under § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The ADEA’s purported abrogation of the States’ sovereign 
immunity is accordingly invalid. 
Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. In evaluating the constitutional right at issue under the ADEA, the Court noted that the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide the same level of protection to 
the aged as other groups, such as those identified by race or gender. Id. at 83. Under the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence, states may discriminate against individuals based on their age as long as that 
discrimination is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. Moreover, the burden is upon the 
plaintiff to demonstrate the irrationality of a state’s discriminatory practices. Id. at 84. As a result, 
Congress’s application of the ADEA to the states effectively placed the burden of persuasion in age 
discrimination cases upon the state and thus imposed a “substantially higher burden” on the states than 
that present under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 87–88. In order to understand fully the approach 
the Court uses to analyze Kimel and subsequent section 5 cases, it is important to understand the 
Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, states 
are required to provide to individuals the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Both Kimel and Florida Prepaid see the beginnings of what resembles 
the Court’s current approach under City of Boerne. That is, they establish 
the importance of first identifying the constitutional right at issue in a 
given section 5 case, as well as examining the record Congress compiled, 
before attempting to enact such legislation. These preliminary steps are 
essential to the congruence and proportionality inquiry, as they provide a 
yardstick by which to measure the appropriateness of Congress’s chosen 
remedy under section 5.  
In 2001, the Court faced its first case testing the ADA’s abrogation of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama v. Garrett.56 The Court began its analysis by first noting that 
While state actors have the power to act in a way that discriminates against certain classifications of 
individuals, the Equal Protection Clause imposes varying burdens on the states to demonstrate the 
validity of such classifications. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–41 
(1985). As a general matter, legislation is presumptively constitutional, and any classifications that 
result in discriminatory treatment are valid, so long as they bear a rational relationship to a legitimate 
state interest. Id. at 440.  
 This general rule does not apply where state conduct relies on certain classifications such as race, 
alienage, or national origin. Id. Such laws or conduct are subject to strict judicial scrutiny and will only 
be upheld if they are “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. (citations omitted). 
Other classifications such as gender are also subjected to a heightened form of judicial scrutiny 
somewhere in between so-called rational basis review and strict scrutiny. Id. Under this heightened 
judicial scrutiny, a classification will be upheld only if it is “substantially related to a sufficiently 
important governmental interest.” Id. at 441 (citations omitted).  
 Under both strict and heightened scrutiny, the burden of demonstrating the constitutional validity 
of a classification is borne by the party seeking to uphold the classification. See Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (heightened scrutiny); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184, 196 (1964) (strict scrutiny).  
 In addition to certain suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, state actions that deprive citizens 
of certain rights deemed “fundamental” are subject to greater judicial scrutiny than rational basis. 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004). It is important to note, however, that the Court has 
declined to read the Constitution as guaranteeing, either implicitly or explicitly, a fundamental right to 
education. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); see also Sellers v. 
Sch. Bd. of the City of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Rodriguez and holding 
education not to be a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution); Johnson v. S. Conn. State 
Univ., No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-2065, 2004 WL 2377225, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004) (same).  
 In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the school financing system used by 
the state of Texas. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4. The lower court determined that the financing system 
operated to discriminate against poor children. Id. at 18. Because of this disparate treatment, the lower 
court found that poor children represented a suspect class. Id. It further argued that the importance of 
education demanded a determination that education was a “fundamental right.” Id. Consequently, the 
lower court determined that strict scrutiny applied to the Texas school financing system. Id. In 
reviewing the decision on appeal, the Supreme Court held that a suspect class did not exist. Id. at 16–
28. Moreover, the Court held education not to be a fundamental right. Id. at 29–40. As a consequence, 
rational basis and not strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. Id. at 40.  
 56. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). In Garrett, the Court faced a 
challenge to Title I of the ADA and the fact that it subjects state entities to suit in federal court for 
disability discrimination in employment. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 
(2000)). Under Title I, employers, including states, are prohibited from “discriminat[ing] against a 
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Congress, in enacting the ADA, had expressed its unequivocal intent to 
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity.57 The Court next conducted its 
“congruence and proportionality” analysis.58 
The Garrett Court made clear that the analysis of section 5 legislation 
and its congruence and proportionality first begins by identifying the 
“metes and bounds” of the constitutional rights at issue.59 Once the 
constitutional right has been identified, the inquiry moves to whether 
Congress, in enacting its prophylactic legislation, first identified a 
historical pattern of constitutional violations on the part of the states.60  
The majority found that the record before Congress lacked any 
showing of a pattern of unconstitutional treatment of the disabled on the 
part of the states in employment decisions.61 In addition to the fact that the 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, 
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 
12111(2), (5), (7). The ADA requires covered employers to make “reasonable accommodations” to 
address the mental and physical challenges posed by an individual’s disability unless doing so would 
create an “undue hardship.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 Plaintiff Patricia Garrett was a nurse at the University of Alabama’s Birmingham Hospital. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362. She took substantial medical leave in order to receive cancer treatments, and 
upon her return to work, her supervisor informed her that she would have to give up her position. Id. 
Thereafter, she applied for and was placed in a lower paying position. Id. Plaintiff Milton Ash was an 
employee of the Alabama Department of Youth Services. Id. Mr. Ash suffered from both chronic 
asthma and sleep apnea; however, his employer refused to make any accommodations for Mr. Ash. Id. 
Ash and Garrett each filed separate causes of action; their cases were later consolidated on appeal to 
the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 362–63.  
 57. Id. at 364 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202).  
 58. Id. at 365–74. 
 59. Id. at 368. “The first step in applying these now familiar principles [of congruence and 
proportionality] is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Id. at 
365. In analyzing the constitutional right at issue under Title I, the Court examined the protection 
afforded the disabled as a class under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 365–67. The Court looked to 
its prior decision in City of Cleburne and determined that the disabled were neither a “suspect” nor 
“quasi-suspect” class, and therefore, legislation making such classifications is subject merely to 
rational basis review. Id. at 366 (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446). While City of Cleburne 
involved the review of a zoning statute that was allegedly discriminatory toward the mentally 
challenged, the Garrett Court read City of Cleburne as establishing a broader rule for both the 
physically and mentally disabled. Id. “Thus, the result of Cleburne is that States are not required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions 
toward such individuals are rational.” Id. at 367. 
 60. Id. at 368 (“Just as § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to actions committed 
‘under color of state law,’ Congress’ § 5 authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state 
transgressions.”).  
 61. Id. at 369–72. The Court noted Congress’s general finding that society has historically 
“isolate[d]” and “segregate[d]” the disabled. Id. at 369 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)). However, 
while the Court acknowledged ample support in the legislative record for Congress’s conclusions, the 
majority noted that many of the incidents in the record did not involve state actors. Id. The majority 
also argued that Congress’s failure to find that public sector employment was among the areas in 
which a federal prohibition of disability discrimination was needed suggested that Congress did not 
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Court viewed the legislative record of the ADA as scant with respect to a 
historical pattern of constitutional violations, the Court also criticized the 
ADA as wholly out of proportion to the wrongs Congress sought to 
prevent.62 As with the ADEA in Kimel, the ADA represented a substantial 
increase in the burden on state conduct over that imposed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 
The Garrett decision provided the first clear delineation of the three-
step approach to analyzing the constitutionality of section 5 legislation. 
That is, the inquiry begins by identifying the specific constitutional right at 
issue. The inquiry next moves to whether Congress, prior to enacting the 
remedial legislation, has identified a pattern of constitutional violations by 
the states. The final step requires an analysis of the congruence and 
proportionality of the congressional solution with respect to the 
constitutional violations sought to be prevented.  
In 2003, the Court faced another challenge to congressional abrogation 
of Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.64 As 
recognize states as having engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination. Id. at 
371–72 (citations omitted). The dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Ginsburg, criticized the Court’s analysis of the congressional record. Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). According to the dissent, Congress compiled a record including hundreds of references to 
discriminatory treatment of the disabled by state officials. Id. at 379. However, the majority responded 
that these were not legislative findings but anecdotal accounts of disparate treatment of the disabled, 
taken out of context, that did not necessarily rise to the level of unconstitutional action on the part of 
the states. Id. at 370.  
 The dissenters argued that the Court ignored the fact that Congress is not bound by the same 
restraints in crafting section 5 remedies as the courts are in their equal protection analysis. Id. at 383 
(“The problem with the Court’s approach is that neither the ‘burden of proof’ that favors States nor 
any other rule of restraint applicable to judges applies to Congress when it exercises its § 5 power.”). 
The dissent noted that Congress must often rely on anecdotal accounts during its deliberations. Id. at 
380. Congress need not make the sort of full evidentiary determinations that are necessary in a 
proceeding before a court. Id.; see also Melissa Hart, Conflating Scope of Right with Standard of 
Review: The Supreme Court’s “Strict Scrutiny” of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1091, 1092–93 (2001) (analyzing the Court’s treatment of section 5 
legislation: “[i]n effect, the Court has declared that it will apply a kind of ‘strict scrutiny’ to federal 
legislation that would receive only minimal scrutiny were a state to pass an identical law”). 
 62. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371–72.  
 63. Id. at 372–73. Under rational basis scrutiny, a disabled plaintiff would bear the burden of 
demonstrating unlawful employment discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause; however, 
the ADA places the burden of establishing “undue hardship” for failing to accommodate an 
employee’s disability on the state. Id.  
 64. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003). Under the FMLA, an eligible 
employee is entitled to take up to twelve weeks of leave each year for a variety of reasons, including 
the onset of serious illness of immediate family members. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) 
(2000)). Moreover, the FMLA authorizes employees to pursue a private right of action in either state 
or federal court against employers (including public employers) who interfere with their rights under 
the FMLA. Id. at 724–25 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a)(2)). The respondent, William 
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with previous section 5 legislation, the Court began by identifying the 
constitutional right at issue under the FMLA.65 The FMLA sought to 
equalize the positions of working men and women who become 
responsible for the care of family members.66 Because the FMLA sought 
to prevent the negative effects of gender-based classifications, the Court 
noted that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from making such 
classifications unless they “serv[e] important governmental objectives,” 
and that such classifications must be “substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.”67  
Following identification of the applicable constitutional principle, the 
Court examined the legislative record before Congress in enacting the 
FMLA.68 In examining the legislative history, the Court first noted the 
historical pattern of unconstitutional gender discrimination on the part of 
states.69 Congress also reacted to a gender gap in maternity and paternity 
leave coverage.70 Congress faced a clear record of unconstitutional gender 
discrimination in the manner in which the states administered family leave 
for their employees; consequently prophylactic section 5 legislation was 
an appropriate congressional response.71 
Hibbs, worked for the Nevada Department of Human Resources’ Welfare Division. Id. at 725. In the 
spring of 1997, Hibbs sought leave from work to care for his wife who had recently been injured in a 
collision. Id. Following notification by his employer that he had utilized all of his FMLA leave and 
had subsequently failed to return to work at the time specified, Hibbs was terminated. Id. Following 
that action, Hibbs filed suit in federal district court against the Nevada Department of Human 
Resources. Id. The court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict 
among the circuits regarding the validity of the FMLA’s abrogation of the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Id. 
 65. Id. at 728.  
 66. Id. at 728–29.  
 67. Id. at 728–29 (internal citations omitted). As the Court noted, “[t]he FMLA aims to protect 
the right to be free from gender-based discrimination. . . . We have held that statutory classifications 
that distinguish between males and females are subject to heightened [(intermediate) judicial] 
scrutiny.” Id. at 728.  
 68. Id. at 729–35.  
 69. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729–30. Historically, states used stereotypic notions of women and their 
place in society to deny them access to certain employment opportunities, such as the legal profession. 
Id. at 729. Courts even acquiesced in these discriminatory efforts. Id. (citing Bradwell v. State, 16 
Wall. 130 (1873); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948)).  
 70. Id. at 730–31. While the studies regarding family leave were collected from private sector 
employers, the Court noted that Congress also received testimony that the private and public sector 
differed little with respect to such leave policies. Id. at 730 n.3.  
 71. Id. at 735. The Court made explicit a conclusion that could likely be drawn from both Kimel 
and Garrett. That is, the Court noted that the onus on Congress to demonstrate a pattern of 
constitutional violations in enacting section 5 legislation varies with respect to the applicable judicial 
standard. Id. at 735–36. That is, where the Court has identified the appropriate level of scrutiny to be 
applied under the Equal Protection Clause, Congress’s burden of establishing a pattern of violation is 
lessened with increasing judicial scrutiny. Id. at 736 (“Because the standard for demonstrating the 
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The Court next focused on the congruence and proportionality prong of 
the City of Boerne test.72 The Court determined that the remedy chosen by 
Congress in the FMLA was sufficiently congruent and proportional.73 
While the dissent criticized the FMLA as a government entitlement, the 
majority noted that a failure by the FMLA to mandate family care leave 
would have significantly reduced the effectiveness of Congress’s section 5 
remedy.74 Finally, because Congress created in the FMLA a targeted 
remedy and restricted its scope so as to minimize some of its more onerous 
aspects, the FMLA represented a measured congressional response to a 
need to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and protect female workers.75 
In its 2003–04 term, the Supreme Court handed down its most recent 
pronouncement on the validity of section 5 legislation in Tennessee v. 
Lane.76 As noted earlier, the Lane Court addressed the constitutionality of 
Title II of the ADA and its abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.77 While Title II imposes nondiscrimination requirements on an 
entire array of public services and programs, the particular facts of Lane 
involved access to the courts.78 
constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test[,] 
. . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”).  
 72. Id. at 737–40.  
 73. Id. at 737 (“By creating an across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all eligible 
employees, Congress sought to ensure that family-care leave would no longer be stigmatized as an 
inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female employees, and that employers could not evade 
leave obligations simply by hiring men.”).  
 74. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737–38.  
 75. Id. at 738–39. As the court noted:  
[u]nlike the statutes at issue in City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, which applied broadly to 
every aspect of state employers’ operations, the FMLA is narrowly targeted at the faultline 
between work and family—precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and 
remains strongest—and affects only one aspect of the employment relationship. 
Id. at 738. In addition, Congress placed several restrictions on the application of the FMLA that 
limited its impact on important state functions, among them excluding from the family leave 
requirements elected officials, their staffs, and appointed policymakers. Id. at 739.  
 76. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).  
 77. Id. at 513. Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165, prohibits state and local 
governments from discriminating against the disabled in both access to and provision of public 
services. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 513 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131–12165).  
 78. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513–15. Respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones filed suit against the 
state of Tennessee for violations of Title II of the ADA. Id. at 513–14. Both individuals are paraplegics 
who require the use of a wheelchair. Id. Respondent Lane faced criminal charges, and on his first 
appearance before the court, he had to crawl up two flights of stairs to the second floor courtroom; 
there was no elevator. Id. Upon appearing for the second time, Lane refused to crawl or be carried up 
the stairs and was subsequently arrested for failing to appear. Id. at 514.  
 Respondent Jones was a “certified court reporter.” Id. Her complaint alleged that the 
inaccessibility of courthouses and courtrooms prevented her from working. Id. In addition, she alleged 
that this inaccessibility impeded her ability to participate in the judicial process. Id.  
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As it had in previous Eleventh Amendment cases, the Court began with 
the first prong of the Seminole Tribe test and held that Congress made its 
intent to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity unmistakably clear.79 
Next, the Court examined whether Congress “acted pursuant to a valid 
grant of constitutional authority.”80  
The Court reaffirmed the proposition that Congress has the power 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the states’ 
sovereign immunity.81 According to the Court, “§ 5 authorizes [Congress] 
to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are 
discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of 
the Equal Protection Clause.”82  
The Court then moved to the City of Boerne inquiry to analyze the 
appropriateness of Congress’s approach in enacting Title II.83 Beginning 
with the first step of the City of Boerne analysis (identifying the 
constitutional right at issue), the Court noted that the disabled are entitled 
to the minimum level of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.84 However, the Court noted that Title II’s antidiscrimination 
provisions applied to a wide range of government services, some of which 
implicate the deterrence of certain constitutional violations that demand 
more stringent judicial scrutiny.85  
The Court next focused on the appropriateness of Title II as valid 
section 5 legislation by examining the historical record faced by Congress 
in enacting the ADA.86 In enacting Title II, Congress faced a historical 
pattern of discrimination in the provision of public services by state and 
local governments.87 Congress not only saw a pattern of continuing 
discrimination in the public services arena, but it also noted the 
 79. Id. at 518 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202).  
 80. Id. at 517 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)).  
 81. Lane, 541 U.S. at 518 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)). The Court noted 
that Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment is a “broad power indeed.” Id. (quoting 
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982)). Congress’s section 5 enforcement power 
authorizes it to proscribe a wider array of conduct than that which is expressly prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 518.  
 82. Id. at 520.  
 83. Id. at 522.  
 84. Id. (“[C]lassifications based on disability violate [the Equal Protection Clause] if they lack a 
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”).  
 85. Id. at 522–23 (“Title II, like Title I, seeks to enforce this prohibition on irrational disability 
discrimination. But it also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, 
infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial review.”). 
 86. Lane, 541 U.S. at 524–31. 
 87. Id. at 524 (“It is not difficult to perceive the harm that Title II is designed to address. 
Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of 
state services and programs, including systemic deprivations of fundamental rights.”).  
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shortcomings in previous and existing legislative answers to the problems 
of disability discrimination.88 Congress also received a report from a 
special task force documenting “hundreds of examples of unequal 
treatment of persons with disabilities by States and their political 
subdivisions.”89  
Whereas the Garrett Court rejected any congressional reliance on the 
discriminatory employment decisions of non-state government entities in 
enacting Title I of the ADA,90 the Lane majority explicitly rejected this 
view in the context of Title II.91 With respect to the specific issue of access 
to the courts, the Court noted that Congress was made aware that many 
disabled individuals across the country were denied access to courtrooms 
and court proceedings as a result of their disabilities.92 The voluminous 
record before Congress justified its efforts to provide remedial measures 
for disabled persons subjected to discrimination in the provision of public 
services.93 
As the Court noted, because Title II implicates a wide range of 
constitutional rights, the congruence and proportionality analysis is 
 88. Id. at 1990 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 18). “[E]xisting state laws do not adequately 
counter acts of discrimination against people with disabilities. Current Federal law is also inadequate. 
Currently, Federal anti-discrimination laws only address discrimination by Federal agencies, entities 
that have contracts with the Federal government, and recipients of Federal financial assistance.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 101-485, pt. II, at 47 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 329. For a detailed 
discussion of the continued inadequacies of state antidiscrimination statutes, see Ruth Colker & Adam 
Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 
ALA. L. REV. 1075 (2002).  
 89. Lane, 541 U.S. at 526 (citing Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 379 
(Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391 (App. C to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(containing “[s]ubmissions made by individuals to the Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of 
Americans with Disabilities”).  
 90. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.  
 91. Lane, 541 U.S. at 527 n.16. The dissent, like the majority in Garrett, argued that 
constitutional violations on the part of non-state actors were “irrelevant” to the inquiry into the 
constitutionality of Title II. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority rejected this notion: 
“[i]n any event, our cases have recognized that evidence of constitutional violations on the part of 
nonstate governmental actors is relevant to the § 5 inquiry.” Id. at 527 n.16; see also id. (citing South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312–15 (1966)) (“[M]uch of the evidence in [Katzenbach] . . . 
to which The Chief Justice favorably refers . . . involved the conduct of county and city officials, 
rather than the States.”). 
 92. Id. at 527. A House subcommittee and its appointed task force received evidence of 
“numerous examples” in which disabled persons were excluded from the states’ judicial processes. Id. 
These include “exclusion of persons with visual impairments and hearing impairments from jury 
service, failure of state and local governments to provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired, 
failure to permit the testimony of adults with developmental disabilities in abuse cases, and failure to 
make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with physical disabilities.” Id. at 527.  
 93. Id. at 529 (“This finding, together with the extensive record of disability discrimination that 
underlies it, makes clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services and access 
to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p631 Hampton book pages.doc11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
648 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:631 
 
 
 
 
 
 
appropriately conducted on an “as applied” basis.94 According to the 
Court, the remedy chosen by Congress was congruent and proportional to 
the wrong of denying the disabled access to the courts.95 After all, 
Congress imposed a burden upon the states of ensuring that those disabled 
individuals for whom reasonable accommodations would render the courts 
accessible not be denied such access.96 Moreover, Title II does not require 
states to endure undue hardship to ensure the disabled access to the 
courts.97 Nor does it demand that the states sacrifice the fundamental 
nature of their public services and programs in order to accommodate the 
disabled.98 Thus, Congress’s chosen remedy was appropriate section 5 
legislation.99 
The Court’s current section 5 jurisprudence began with the relatively 
simple statement in City of Boerne that section 5 legislation must be 
congruent and proportional with respect to the constitutional violations it 
aims to remedy. Through subsequent refinement culminating in its most 
recent decision, Lane, the Court has created a three-step inquiry for 
determining whether section 5 legislation passes the City of Boerne test:  
(1) the Court begins by identifying the constitutional right at issue 
given particular section 5 legislation;  
(2) the inquiry next moves to an evaluation of whether Congress has 
identified a historical pattern of constitutional violations on the part 
of the states that justifies enactment of remedial legislation; and 
(3) finally, the scope of the remedy is analyzed in light of the 
determinations made under steps one and two to determine whether 
Congress’s remedy is congruent and proportional to the wrongs it 
seeks to prevent.  
 94. Id. at 530–31. For the Court, the relevant inquiry was whether Congress validly abrogated the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to access to the courts. Id. at 531–32. In rejecting 
the dissent’s claim that the analysis should focus on Title II in its entirety, the Court stated, “[i]t is 
unclear what, if anything, examining Title II’s applications to hockey rinks or voting booths can tell us 
about whether Title “substantively redefines the right of access to the courts.” Id. at 531 n.18. 
 95. Id. at 531–32. 
 96. Id. at 531.  
 97. Id. at 532. 
 98. Id. at 531–32. Title II and the subsequent administrative regulations provide a measured 
response to constitutional violations. Id. “Title II does not require States to employ any and all means 
to make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does not require States to 
compromise their essential eligibility criteria for public programs. It requires only ‘reasonable 
modifications’.” Id.  
 99. Id. at 533–34.  
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III. ANALYSIS  
The Lane decision and its predecessor sovereign immunity cases leave 
unanswered whether Jane, introduced above, has the right to sue a state for 
ADA violations. In the context of education of the disabled, Title II of the 
ADA represents the relevant provision, as it proscribes discrimination 
against the disabled in access to and provision of public services and 
programs.100 Because the ADA authorizes suits against states by private 
citizens,101 the ultimate inquiry focuses on the propriety of Congress’s 
abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity. 
This analysis begins with a two-step inquiry. In order to validly 
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) Congress must 
make its intention to do so unequivocally clear; and (2) such abrogation 
must derive from a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutionally defined 
powers.102 With respect to the first question, the Court has made clear that 
Congress, in enacting the ADA, expressed its unequivocal intent to 
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity.103  
The second prong of the test requires an analysis of whether 
Congress’s action was valid under its section 5 enforcement powers.104 As 
Congress does not have Article I power to authorize private suits against 
the states,105 the remaining inquiry asks whether Title II represents valid 
section 5 legislation in the context of education.106  
The first step in analyzing the propriety of section 5 legislation is to 
identify the “metes and bounds” of the constitutional right at issue.107 
Under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, steps taken by state 
actors that discriminate against the disabled are subject to the minimum 
 100. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2005). 
 101. See id. § 12202 (2005). 
 102. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004); Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).  
 103. Lane, 541 U.S. at 518; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.  
 104. In cases involving both the ADA and other congressional attempts to abrogate the states’ 
sovereign immunity, the Court has very clearly rejected any congressional power to take such action 
under its Article I powers. See e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 (analyzing Title I of the ADA); Kimel, 
528 U.S. at 79 (analyzing the ADEA); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) 
(“The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used 
to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).  
 105. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 64. 
 106. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 530–31 (holding that the question of whether Title II is a valid exercise 
of Congress’ section 5 power should be answered on an as applied basis focusing on the specific 
application of Title II at issue).  
 107. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.  
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level of judicial scrutiny.108 Under this rational basis scrutiny, a 
classification based upon disability is only unconstitutional if it is not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.109 Furthermore, the burden 
of establishing the impropriety of such a classification rests upon the 
challenging party.110 The Court has not identified education as a 
fundamental right;111 therefore, any state actions impinging on our 
hypothetical student Jane’s112 educational rights are subject only to the 
courts’ minimal judicial scrutiny.113 
Having identified the constitutional right at issue under Jane’s claim, 
the analysis moves to an examination of the record before Congress. The 
Lane Court viewed the record before Congress in enacting the ADA as 
“mak[ing it] clear beyond peradventure” that public services and facilities 
were appropriate subjects for prophylactic legislation.114 More specifically, 
in the public education context, the appendix to Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Garrett presents numerous examples of unequal treatment of the 
disabled.115 While many of these incidents involve unequal treatment of 
the disabled by local agencies, the Court made clear that the actions of a 
state’s political subdivisions are relevant in section 5 analysis.116 It appears 
that the Lane analysis leaves little room for doubt that areas of state 
conduct covered by Title II were appropriate targets for section 5 
legislation.117  
 108. Lane, 541 U.S. at 539–40; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366–68 (discussing City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).  
 109. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367. 
 110. Id. (citations omitted). 
 111. For a discussion, see supra note 55; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
 112. See supra Part I. 
 113. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40.  
 114. Lane, 541 U.S. at 529. Although the issue before the Court was the application of Title II to 
access to judicial proceedings, the Court did not confine its analysis to the historical record of 
inaccessible judicial services. Id. at 524–30.  
 115. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391 (App. C to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting). As the Lane Court 
noted, the examples of unequal treatment by state and local agencies contained in this appendix 
showed further evidence of the failure of previous efforts at the state and federal level to prevent 
disability discrimination. Lane, 541 U.S. at 1990.  
 116. Lane, 541 U.S. at 1991 n.16 (noting that much of the discriminatory conduct relied upon in S. 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312–15 (1966), involved that of local officials).  
 117. The Chief Justice is extremely critical of the majority approach in Lane. “Rather than 
limiting its discussion of constitutional violations to the due process rights on which it ultimately 
relies, the majority sets out on a wide-ranging account of societal discrimination against the disabled.” 
Id. at 541. Moreover, in reference to the majority’s reliance on the accounts of unequal treatment 
found in Appendix C to Justice Breyer’s Garrett dissent, the Chief Justice stated, “[a]s in Garrett, this 
‘unexamined, anecdotal’ evidence does not suffice.” Id. at 542 (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370).  
 It is difficult to reconcile the approach to the legislative record taken by Garrett and Lane. 
However, one distinguishing characteristic is that Garrett focused purely on the application of a 
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Thus, the final section 5 hurdle to overcome in order to allow Jane to 
pursue a claim against a state or its agencies under Title II is that of 
congruence and proportionality. The Garrett analysis is instructive for this 
inquiry, even though it addressed Title I of the ADA, because the 
applicable Equal Protection Clause principles involved in Jane’s claim are 
identical to those in Garrett.118 Because Title II imposes the burden on the 
state of demonstrating an undue hardship in failing to accommodate the 
disabled,119 the Court would likely raise the same objections to Title II in 
the education context as it did to Title I in Garrett.120 That is, whereas 
rational basis review requires the complaining party to negate any 
reasonable grounds for a State’s discriminatory act, Title II imposes on the 
governmental entity the burden of validating its reasons for failing to 
accommodate disabilities.121 
Moreover, Title II proscribes a much wider swath of conduct than does 
the Equal Protection Clause. As the Garrett Court noted, Title I’s 
accommodation requirement prevented a state from selecting nondisabled 
job applicants who were able to use existing facilities.122 However, such 
financial considerations provide perfectly rational bases for justifying 
constitutional right subject merely to rational basis scrutiny; whereas, Title II implicated a broad range 
of constitutional rights subject to not only rational basis but also heightened and strict judicial scrutiny. 
Lane, 541 U.S. at 522. Regardless of what accounts for this difference in approach, the ultimate 
resolution of the appropriateness of Title II in the public education context will turn on the congruence 
and proportionality analysis.  
 118. Title I did not implicate the exercise of a fundamental right nor did it attempt to prevent 
discrimination against a constitutionally suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366. 
Thus, the discriminatory behavior Title I sought to prevent is subject to the same minimal judicial 
scrutiny as discrimination against the disabled in the public education context.  
 119. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2004): 
 (a) A public entity shall operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, 
program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities. This paragraph does not— 
. . .  
(3) Require a public entity to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial 
and administrative burdens. In those circumstances where personnel of the public entity 
believe that the proposed action would fundamentally alter the service, program, or activity or 
would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, a public entity has the burden of 
proving that compliance with § 35.150(a) of this part would result in such alteration or 
burdens. 
 120. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372 (referring to an employer’s right to exempt itself from the ADA’s 
accommodations requirements if able to demonstrate such accommodations would create undue 
hardship, the Court stated that “[t]he Act also makes it the employer’s duty to prove that it would 
suffer such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate 
reasonable bases for the employer’s decision.”).  
 121. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).  
 122. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.  
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constitutional discrimination against the disabled.123 Title II imposes 
similar constraints on states in requiring them to go well beyond that 
demanded by the Constitution in their provision of public services.124  
Given that the Constitution requires only that states not engage in 
irrational discrimination against the disabled in providing educational 
services, Title II works a substantive change in the legal relationship 
between states and their citizens. The expansive requirements of Title II, at 
least in the context of educational services, go well beyond what is 
required of states by the Equal Protection Clause. While Congress’s 
attempt to level the playing field for disabled students through Title II 
marks a fundamental shift in federal policy, it will likely fail the current 
Court’s section 5 constitutionality analysis as applied to education of the 
disabled.125 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The Court’s current approach to Equal Protection cases involving the 
disabled assigns a disabled plaintiff the burden of demonstrating the 
unconstitutionality of state actions. However, not only is education among 
the most important of the services provided by state and local 
governments, but it is also an essential step in preventing the development 
of a class system that perpetually limits the opportunities of certain classes 
of individuals.126 Education provides a key to unlock those doors closed by 
 123. Id.  
 124. As the Lane dissent noted, “Title II prohibits far more state conduct than does the equal 
protection ban on irrational discrimination.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 1978, 549 (2004) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 125. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (“If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, 
they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (arguing that the ADEA was a disproportionate response to 
constitutional violations and noting that the ADEA effectively imposed heightened (intermediate) 
judicial scrutiny on age discrimination by state employers whereas the Constitution required only 
rational basis scrutiny). The Lane approach is inapposite in this context because the Court explicitly 
declined to address the congruence and proportionality of Title II as applied to public services such as 
education that implicate only the minimal form of constitutional protection afforded the disabled. 
Lane, 541 U.S. at 533 n.20. But see Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 
F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Garrett and holding Title II to be valid § 5 legislation at least 
in the higher education context); Ass’n for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 
959 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 126. See Elizabeth Reilly, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other & the Next 
Century, 34 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2000); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The 
Brown Court noted: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is 
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society’s handicapping, if well-intentioned, perceptions of the abilities of 
those with disabilities to enter the mainstream of society. Thus, requiring 
disabled plaintiffs to bear the burden of demonstrating the 
unconstitutionality of state actions in the education context creates a task 
of Herculean magnitude that demands overcoming societal perceptions of 
disability.  
While education is important to every American citizen, ensuring that 
the disabled have access to educational services on an equal basis is of 
particular importance. That is, educational opportunities help disabled 
students develop the skills that allow them fully to participate in society. 
In addition, interactions between the disabled and nondisabled serve to 
tear down the barriers of fear and stereotyping that surround disability.  
The importance of equality in the provision of educational services 
demands a higher level of constitutional protection. In Plyler v. Doe, the 
Court did just that in holding that a Texas law denying illegal immigrants 
access to public schools should be subject to heightened judicial 
scrutiny.127 Just as children whose parents have illegally entered the 
country should not be denied educational opportunities because of their 
parents’ choices,128 disabled students should no more be denied 
educational opportunities because of a disability that is beyond their 
control.129  
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms. 
Id. 
 127. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (stating that the Texas statute denying public 
education to children of illegal immigrants can only stand if it furthers “some substantial goal of the 
State”).  
 128. See id. at 220 (“§ 21.031 is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden 
on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little control. It is thus difficult to 
conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the United 
States. Yet that appears to be precisely the effect of § 21.031.”).  
 129. For example, although Jane is fully capable of learning, external limitations imposed by 
stereotypic notions of her limitations serve to curtail not only her educational opportunities but also 
future opportunities to contribute effectively to society. See also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–22 (citing 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). 
In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage, 
denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of 
the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable 
obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit. Paradoxically, by depriving the 
children of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group 
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In the modern world, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of 
education. Not only is education the key to financial independence and 
self-sufficiency, it is a prerequisite to full participation in the political 
process.130 Thus, ensuring that the disabled have adequate access to 
educational services ensures that they will have the ability to become 
effective participants in the civic community. By giving disabled students 
the tools to learn and compete, education allows them to become 
advocates for themselves in the political process. This representation will, 
in turn, translate into a shift in the manner in which other members of our 
society view the disabled.131  
Applying a heightened form of judicial scrutiny to Jane’s claim and 
similar claims would resolve the principal objections to the ADA’s 
breadth raised in Garrett. That is, the ADA’s imposition of a burden upon 
the governmental entity seeking to avoid accommodation would be in step 
with the burden to demonstrate constitutionality under heightened judicial 
scrutiny. Moreover, the conduct prohibited by the ADA mirrors that 
prohibited by the intermediate level of constitutional protection where 
state action is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.132 
might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority. But more directly, 
“education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.” 
Id. 
 130. See Reilly, supra note 125, at 1–2 (2000). 
Thinking about the interaction between the Constitution and education reveals that they are 
deeply interconnected, at profound levels of interdependence and complexity. . . . A 
fundamental interdependence was formed with the decision to formulate our governmental 
structure as a democratic republic. The Constitution created the necessity for adequate public 
education to prepare the citizenry to exercise the role of self-government. An educated voting 
public underpins a successful democratic structure. . . . 
 131. Cf. Reilly, supra note 129, at 2 (“[O]ur social system rests on two largely accepted goals that 
each require access to education—the ‘melting pot’ which requires successful absorption of diverse 
immigrant populations into a pluralistic social and cultural structure, and ‘upward mobility’ which 
requires the permeability of class barriers.”). The author’s “melting pot” observation, while referring 
to the absorption of immigrant populations into mainstream society, has strong parallels in the context 
of education for the disabled. That is, adequate access to education for disabled students gives both 
disabled and nondisabled students an opportunity to interact and serves to dispel misconceptions each 
group might have about the other. Moreover, the opportunity for “upward mobility” is extremely 
relevant in the disability education context, and education provides the means by which any class that 
has been traditionally subordinated might overcome such inferior status and enter into full societal 
participation.  
 132. In the alternative, Congress could amend the ADA to prohibit only irrational discrimination 
with respect to the actions of the states in educating the disabled. While this change would likely 
answer the principal objections of the Garret Court, see supra note 63, with respect to the over breadth 
of the ADA, it would do little to assist disabled students in attaining equality in the education context. 
After all, the rationality requirement allows states to make decisions based on societal notions of the 
limitations imposed by disability, thus perpetuating those stereotypes to the continued detriment of 
disabled students. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 926 (arguing that stereotypic notions of disability 
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V. CONCLUSION  
The current Court’s equal protection jurisprudence presents an 
interesting set of challenges to the applicability of the ADA in the context 
of education. That is, it seems clear that the law, as it stands, would bar a 
student plaintiff from asserting a claim under the ADA against a state or 
one of its agencies. Because education is not a fundamental right and the 
disabled, as a class, are protected by only the minimal equal protection 
standard, Congress’s statutory solution to combat discrimination against 
the disabled is likely too broad in scope to satisfy the Court’s City of 
Boerne test.133  
The principal objection that the Court would raise to Title II of the 
ADA as applied to education is the excessive burden it imposes upon the 
states.134 Under the Court’s equal protection approach, states need only 
avoid irrational discrimination against the disabled in the education 
context.135 Moreover, a plaintiff seeking redress under the Equal 
Protection Clause bears the burden of demonstrating that irrationality.136 In 
contrast, Title II imposes upon the state the burden of demonstrating the 
hardship of accommodating an individual with a disability.137  
Because Title II, as applied to education, fails to satisfy the 
constitutional demands of valid section 5 legislation, a change in the 
Court’s approach is necessary. The importance of education in improving 
the circumstances of the disabled demands a more rigorous judicial 
scrutiny for state actions that impinge on the educational rights of the 
disabled. Under such heightened scrutiny, the burden imposed by the 
ADA and the Equal Protection Clause would mirror each other much more 
closely, and the principal objections to the ADA’s statutory approach on 
the part of the Court would be addressed.  
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